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The subject of this paper is a new approach to management  being initiated in
the State of Maine, USA. This approach is the result of years of informal discussions
among people in industry, government and the university.
The description that follows is my personal interpretation of the rationale and
possible directions the approach will take. As in any other fishery, our goal is biological
sustainability.  From a broad perspective, however, the initiative is based on the premise
that  fisheries  management  is  a social  problem  that  only  can be  solved with  the
development  of appropriate  institutions  and  individual  incentives.  Given  the
complexity of the ocean  environment--especially  the sources  of sustainability-
and given the difficulty of  workable private property rights arrangements, this initiative
places  an emphasis on group or community rights and responsibilities.
This initiative differs from traditional fisheries management approaches in four
distinct ways:
*  The Biology  of the Fishery. We depart from the usual single-species ap-
proach. Instead, we adopt an ecosystem approach.
Ecosystem approaches to fisheries are like the weather:  "Everyone talks
about it, but no one does anything about it." The reason for inaction usually
is  the fearsome  complexities  that appear  to  accompany  an  ecosystem
approach. But we don't think it is all that difficult, as I'll try to explain.
*  The Rules Necessary for the Restraint of Fishing. In this regard, the Maine
approach emphasizes rules that are consistent with an ecosystem approach.
These are "when, where and how" fishing takes place, rather than the usual
approach, which lays the emphasis on "how much should be caught."
*  The Human Side of the Fishery. We depart from the conventional  top-
down, technocratic management approach and adopt a bottom-up, democratic
approach. We believe democratic processes and responsibilities-especially
at  the very  local  level-are  absolutely  essential  for the  development  of
individual incentives appropriate  to a sense of stewardship. Stewardship  is
an essential  (in  fact,  superior)  substitute  for  always-too-expensive  and
inadequate  state  policing.  It  also  creates  an atmosphere  in  which  good
science is not subverted by myopic  political and economic interests.
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of participants  in the fishery.  Our purpose  is  not to  create  an  individual
property  right  or  to  set  controls  on  fishing  effort,  but  rather  to  create
boundaries  for the  democratic  community  involved  in  the  management
process.  We want  to identify who  has rights  to fish and  has accepted  the
responsibilities that go along with those rights.
To implement this. we are developing an apprenticeship system that will
require  new  entrants  to  take  a  number of courses  and  spend  two  years
working with a senior fisherman before they can be licensed. A secondary
and incidental effect of the apprenticeship system will be to slow entry. But
we  see no reason why it should  stop exit, as so often  is the case.
This paper begins with an outline of the scientific and economic/social  theories
or perspectives  that are at the root of this approach. It concludes with a description
of:  (1) the  steps  we  have  taken  to begin  implementing  the  approach  and  (2)  the
strategy we intend to take over the next few years.
Taking an Ecological Approach to Sustainability
Almost  every  fisheries  biologist  I  know  would  agree  that  an  ecosystem
approach to fisheries management would be desirable, if it were practical. But most
believe it is terribly impractical and probably even unnecessary.
The sense of impracticality arises when biologists attempt to envision the kinds
of models and knowledge that would be required if we were  to extend our  typical
single-species  models  in order to incorporate  all possible ecological  connections.
Given the immense number of biotic  and abiotic interactions  that might have to be
incorporated  into  our models  and the  enormous  resources  that would  have to be
devoted to measurement and monitoring the ocean-to  say nothing of our current
lack of knowledge of these interactions-the idea of an ecosystem approach seems,
although desirable,  preposterously impractical.
Besides, most fisheries biologists think it may not be necessary to incorporate
all ecological  interactions  fully in order to manage  fish stocks.  So long as they can
depend  on the normal  equilibrium tendencies  in  the population  and so long as we
fish at a moderate  rate, stocks  should  stay in their  normal  range, and  the kinds  of
single-species models  used all along should be sufficient (Scott).
But our perspective on the logic that extrapolates  from a single-species approach
is this: There are other views of how an ecosystem is structured  (Wilson et al.).
Most  ecologists now view  ecosystems  as  more than a  collection of species;
ecosystems have definite spatial and temporal structure.  In nonfisheries  ecology--
especially  recent  work  on  landscape,  meta-population  and  hierarchy  theory--
questions  of extinction  and abundance  of individual  species  are  a  function of the
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1991;  O'Neil et al.  1986). The system  itself is seen as heterogeneous  in space  and
time,  with  somewhat  independent,  patchily  distributed  subsystems  and perhaps
even  sub-subsystems  at  various  scales.  Each  of these  subsystems  may have  a
relatively distinct assemblage of species and habitat, depending on local conditions.
Population  sizes  within  a  subsystem  are  likely  to be highly  variable  over  time,
depending  on  environmental  and other  conditions-including  the conditions  that
govern both the import and export of energy through migration and transport from
other  subsystems.
Collectively (i.e.,  from the system perspective), the multiplicity of subsystems
creates  redundancy  that translates  into  resilience  for the  system  and  the  species
within it.  If catastrophic  local events  occur that destroy or degrade  one or several
subsystems,  rebuilding or recolonization can occur with migration from proximate,
healthy subsystems. The speed of rebuilding depends on many factors, but probably
is much slower than might be expected for any single species, due to the need  "to fit
the pieces together."  So, one would expect subsystems to operate on a different and
slower temporal scale than that followed by single populations (O'Neil et al. 1986).
So long as human activity destroys subsystems at a rate or in a spatial pattern
that is no greater than the systems'  ability to rebuild those subsystems,  the system
itself is maintained  in what might be called a healthy or resilient state.  But if a large
number  of subsystems  in  a system  are destroyed  or  significantly  impaired-say
through destruction of critical habitat or removal  of one or more important  species
from a local assemblage-one could expect the system as a whole to retain its basic
organization  and resilience only up to some point.
That  point or threshold  would  be  reached  when  the remaining  functional
subsystems  are unable to recolonize damaged subsystems, either because they also
are stressed and thus unable to export "colonists"  or because the basic structure  or
functioning  of damaged  subsystems  has  changed,  making  them  inhospitable  to
"colonists."  Because proximity  is  important  to rebuilding,  one  also might  expect
patterns of degradation to emerge, if the destruction itself is spatially  selective.
At and beyond the threshold, the resilience stemming from redundant subsystems
may  be  lost  and,  with that,  the  ability  of the  system  to  maintain  its  historically
observed  organization in the face of continuing  stress. Healthy  subsystems  (in the
sense of having the original  structure) may begin to fail because they lack essential
imports from other subsystems.
Individual species may lose their resilience and show abundance  and scarcity
unlike any observed historical patterns-most probably, an even greater than normal
variability, with  reduced  average levels  of abundance.  System structure  (species
composition) itself may change dramatically if the stress affects some species more
than others.  Eventually,  newly  dominant  species  may  create  a  systemwide
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system is likely to be one with many overfished species-even though total system
productivity may remain unchanged.  "Overfished" in this sense is simply the forced
restructuring of the ecosystem (Hollings  1986; Hollings  1987).  So, restoring such a
system to its pre-threshold state is not likely to come about by simple reductions in
fishing effort, but rather by the rebuilding of subsystems.
To a large extent, this roughly sketched systems approach repeats many major
themes of traditional single-species theory, especially the idea that resilience (or surplus
production)  is a function of very large reproductive capabilities that allow populations
to  respond to fishing  and other disturbances.  These  are the mechanisms  of density
dependence-which  are the cornerstone of standard theory (Rosenberg et al. 1993).
The principal difference, of course, is that the newer approach sets its theme in
the context of a spatially diverse system, taken as a whole. In this setting the health
and resilience of individual species is a function of the state of  the entire system. The
deleterious  effects  of fishing  are  accounted  for  in terms  of the  accumulated  net
damage  to subsystems.
In a system of this  sort, one might expect individual populations  to show the
kind of resilience posited by traditional theory, so long as a large part of the subsystem
structure remains unimpaired. Under these circumstances,  a moderate level of fishing,
implemented with  a constant percentage of the stock harvested each year, might be
appropriate-as  the usual approach to fisheries argues. The principal management
problem would be that of determining an appropriate moderate yield from the fishery.
From our perspective,  however, even a policy of moderate levels of fishing is
likely to fail in the long  term,  so  long as fishing  is able  to affect  the structure  and
resilience  of the system through removal  of subsystems  (local populations, habitat,
nursery  and spawning grounds,  and  so  forth).  In fact,  even  with low or moderate
fishing levels, one might expect to see distinct patterns of removal,  dictated by the
spatial economics of fishing.
This,  in turn,  could  bring  an  alteration  of system  parameters.  When  these
removals  proceeded  to  the  point  that  resilience  and  structure  were  affected,  the
problems of fisheries  management  would take  on an  entirely different  coloration.
The principal management question would become one of how subsystems might be
restored and, in the longer term, what kinds of  rules might be developed to prevent the
continual  erosion of system  structure.  If one  views the ocean ecosystem from this
perspective,  then  the conceptual  basis  of management  shifts.  Instead of trying to
incorporate  all  possible  biotic  and  abiotic  interactions  in  our models,  we begin
addressing the ways  in which the spatial and temporal structure can be maintained.
As a purely practical  matter,  this  conceptual  approach  minimizes  the amount
of data, the extent of monitoring and the knowledge of ecosystem functioning that is
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the  continuing  state of subsystems.  We  need not know  all the  many  interactions
within  and between  subsystems.
But we do need to be concerned if we observe the loss or degradation of many
subsystems. Because we also can expect to see a great deal of resulting variability in
subsystems, the pattern of functioning is where we are likely to receive our strongest
signals with regard to system health.
From the point of view of fisheries management, this perspective translates into
the need to develop rules that prevent as much loss of subsystems  as possible. Foi
most of our fisheries today, this would require development of rules that allow previously
well-functioning subsystems to regenerate. By and large, this would mean an emphasis
on rules that determine the places and times and methods of fishing, rather than rules
that state how much fishing can take place.
In other words, if sustainability actually is a function of the spatial and temporal
structure of an ecosystem, rules that preserve (or minimize the damage to) that structure
are what  is needed.  Rules  about how many fish to catch do not address that need,
except indirectly. Rules about how, when and where to fish can be tailored much  -more
carefully to the requirements of sustainability.
Traditional Fisheries Concerns
As an aside: We realize that a shift away from rules governing how much fishing
should take place raises  immediate red flags of danger for fisheries biologists  and
economists trained in the classical single-species  approach.
Fisheries biologists tend to argue that a healthy fishery inevitably will attract
more  effort and,  in turn,  that the  increased effort  will tend  to destroy the  healthy
fishery-regardless  of the  gear,  area  or  time  restraints  placed  upon  fishing.
Consequently, the only cure  is controls on entry or catch.
Economists  worry about  that,  plus the  dissipation  of rents.  In other  words,
their additional concern is too much investment of capital and labor, relative to what
could be used to harvest  the fishery.
Our response  is that biologists overlook  the economic effects of such things
as closures,  gear restrictions and  so on. These kinds of rules tend to raise the costs
of fishing-in some cases, dramatically.  The result, of course,  is to reduce entry to
the fishery.
How much this will occur in a system-managed fishery depends on the extent
and nature of the restrictive rules. If applied properly, even without controls on entry
the  approach should lead  to a situation  in which stocks  are maintained, but  profits
for the marginal fisherman fall to the average level in the economy.
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the loss or dissipation of "rents."  Economists'  argument about loss of "rents"  stems
from the single-species model's idea of surplus production. The underlying notion is
that Mother Nature undertakes the production of this surplus at no cost to humans.
The value of this surplus can be wasted if unrestricted entry leads fishermen into a
competitive race to capture the surplus; in the process of doing so, they will invest
in excessive capital and labor in order to win the competition.
The  cure, economists  argue,  is to restrict  entry  and/or to find other ways  to
eliminate the tendency toward overcapitalization. Unstated, but central to the notion
of fishery "rents,"  is the idea that so long as moderate levels of harvest are observed,
there  is no cost to society from the harvest of the  surplus.
In  an  ecosystem  context,  it  is  not  exactly  clear  what  or  how  "surplus
production"  should be interpreted. In one  sense, it simply is  energy removed from
the  system.
But, removing energy from a system cannot be viewed as having no effect.  Its
consequences have to  be shifted  to  other parts  of the  system.  In  other words, the
costs of surplus production may simply show up elsewhere in the form of increased
(or decreased)  populations  of other species or  in other changes of some sort.
If this is the case-if, from a system point of view, there is no surplus production,
as such-then the economists'  argument can simply be dismissed as an artifact of
single-species  theory.  What that  theory  myopically  identifies  as  "rents"  may  be
more directly accounted for in terms of shifts in abundance  elsewhere.
From this perspective, harvesting "surplus production" becomes simply another
one of the many externalities generated by the fishery.  The harvested population can
be expected to have reduced competitive capabilities,  relative to close competitors.
And, over time, it can be expected  to have a lower population.  Other populations
especially unharvested close competitors-can be expected to accrue an advantage
and an increased population.
There  are  many  instances  when this  effect  has  occurred  in  heavily  fished
systems. Perhaps the most striking shift of this sort is the Georges Bank change from
a  system  dominated by  gadoids  (cod,  haddock,  pollock)  to  one  dominated  by
elasmobranchs  (dogfish  sharks  and skates).
Whatever the case,  the concept of "rents"  in an ecosystem  context certainly
needs  to be  rethought  and does  not deserve  at first  glance  the  centerpiece role it
plays in the economic analyses of fisheries and of other wild, renewable  resources.
Surplus production is one of the few instances in which economists believe in a free
lunch. An ecosystem perspective suggests  that the "no free lunch" doctrine  should
be extended to fisheries, too.
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economists and biologists.  We tend to think those concerns  are inappropriate  to an
ecosystem  approach.  This  is  not to  say  that we  do not  have  concerns  about  the
implementation of an ecosystem approach; rather,  those concerns are not the same as
the ones that are central to single-species approaches.
Institutions Appropriate to an Ecosystem Approach
By " institutions," I mean laws, informal norms and customs, private contracts,
organizational  rules-in short,  the  kinds of purely human constructs  that  govern
interactions among ourselves and between ourselves and the physical environment.
Institutions operate to restrain individual behavior. For that reason, they close
off some opportunities.  But the result of that restraint  is the  generation of a much
larger set of individual and collective opportunities for gain. Economists usually see
the principal gains in the form of increased opportunities for exchange. Put differently,
institutions generally shift opportunities away from zero or negative sum games to
positive sum games.
For example,  rules against theft deny thieves certain opportunities. But those
same rules create powerful opportunities for exchange, increased production and the
accumulation of wealth.
Effective  institutions  are those that manage to generate individual incentives
that are consistent or aligned with social objectives. Adam Smith's "invisible hand"
explanation of market incentives in a competitive environment is one example of this
kind of alignment.
Restraint also creates opportunities in fisheries.  Fisheries institutions restrain
certain  kinds  of behavior.  If the  restraints  are appropriate,  however,  they  create
opportunities  in the form of sustained fishing.
The attitudes and associated incentives that accompany this particular form of
restraint are usually called stewardship. The ultimate goal of the Maine management
strategy is to build an atmosphere of stewardship through appropriate institutions.
Institutional Requirements Under Ecosystem  Management
The ecosystem view of the causes of overfishing gives rise to three very important
problems that cannot be easily addressed by existing management institutions:
1. The  approach  demands  attention  be  addressed  to  the  many  scales-
especially  small  and  local  scales-at which  biological  processes  and  events
(subsystems) take place. This contrasts strongly with the prevailing approach, which
emphasizes a single large  scale: the range of the stock.
2.  An  ecological  approach  requires  recognition  of the  systemwide  basis
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of recruitment  lie  outside the factors specific  to each population).  Again,
this contrasts  strongly  with the  prevailing  approach  that  assumes future
recruitment is principally a function of each species'  current population.
3. The complexity of ecosystem interactions means that institutions need to be
tailored  to a world in which the  relationship between cause  and effect  is
likely to be ambiguous and in which surprises are the norm. In contrast to the
prevailing approach, which presumes  "stochastic certainty" and emphasizes
the direct control of  fishing mortality, an ecosystem approach presumes little
or no ability to exercise direct control over long-term population numbers.
As a consequence, it emphasizes the idea of minimizing damage to the basic
processes,  events and habitat of the system so that natural production can
function with as little disturbance as possible.
Criteria for Successful  Management Institutions
This is the broad context to which institutions for ecosystem management must
be well-adapted. By "well-adapted ," we refer generally to institutions with attributes
that lead to a sustainable fishery. We refer particularly to  circumstances in which the
incentives  faced by individuals  are aligned in the best possible way with the social
goal of resource sustainability.
In  the  last  two  decades  social  scientists  have  made  important progress  in
understanding  the  role of institutions  (Ostrom  1997;  Ostrom  and  Ostrom  1977;
Williamson  1985; Eggertsson 1990; Ostrom 1992). Broadly summarized, successful
fisheries institutions must have the following attributes (Wilson and Dickie 1995):
1. They must fully encompass the causes of overfishing within their control.
The restraining rules must...
* Control total effort at a level consistent with total system productivity,
* Accommodate ecosystem phenomena at a variety of spatial and temporal
scales,
* Apply to all resource users, and
* Avoid creating a situation in which control at one scale leads to undesirable
results at other scales  or sites. (If the causes of overfishing lie outside
the institution's control, it fails.)
2.  Institutions must be able to tie the application of rules credibly to an intended
outcome. This is likely to be especially difficult in a complex environment
such  as  fisheries  because  cause-and-effect  relationships  are  always
ambiguous.  It therefore  is  critical that  there be a  sense  among users  that
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part will likely lead to the intended, positive result.
But, equally, if the intended result apparently will not be forthcoming, it
must be clear that a reasonable process of revision and new rule development
will take place. Institutions must go through a continuous learning process-
a learning process very similar to the scientific process, complete with active
feedback  about  failure  or success.  To  the  extent  that  credibility  and  an
ongoing  learning  process  cannot  be  established,  administrative  and
enforcement  costs rise and  the success of the institution declines.
3. Institutions must provide individuals with reasonable assurance that others
will  follow the  rules  or face  effective  punishment.  The  process  of rule
development  and negotiation-face-to-face  discussions-is  important to
the  reduction  in  uncertainty  about  the  intent  of other participants  with
regard to compliance with rules and agreements (Runge  1982). To the extent
these  assurances cannot  be generated,  the effectiveness  of the  institution
declines or its enforcement costs rise.
4.  Institutions  must  create  equitable  sharing  of the  costs  and benefits  of
sustaining  the  resource.  To  the  extent  that  equitable  sharing  cannot be
arranged,  individuals-not  all,  but  some-may  rightfully  oppose  the
particular rules that lead to this result. In self-defense, they also may oppose
the  entire  social objective.  Thus,  when  individual  interests  cannot  be
harmonized with social interests, enforcement costs rise.
5. The institution  must  efficiently  carry  out  the transactions  required  of
management.  Maintaining  exclusive  control  (through  measurement,
monitoring  and enforcement),  developing  credible rules, and maintaining
harmonious  incentives  and assurances  require  extensive  and intensive
transactions. More than any other criterion, the ability to minimize the time
and the opportunity and financial  costs*  of these transactions  determines
a  workable  institutional  structure.  To  the  extent  transactions  cannot be
conducted  effectively  and efficiently, all institutional functions suffer.
No institution can perfectly meet these criteria. But institutions can be more or
less well-adapted to their human  and natural  environments.  In  fisheries,  what we
believe  to be  the attributes of well-adapted institutions depends  very much on our
scientific view of the mechanisms that generate sustainability.
It  should  not  be  surprising, therefore,  that  institutions  whose  foundations
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*  The  costs of avoiding  the  higher costs  of improperly  carried  out  transactions,  such  as  those
based  on  incomplete  or biased  inforimation,  deceptions  and so  on.rest on single-species  theory do not appear well-adapted to ecosystem  approaches.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQ's), for example, appear to be a near-panacea
from the perspective of single-species theory. But from an ecosystem perspective,
species-specific ITQ's are not likely to provide meaningful control over the sources
of the long-run sustainability of each species. Those sources are found in the broader
environment of the fishery.
For example, say flounder recruitment depends crucially on undisturbed benthic
habitat, but that habitat is regularly fished with hydraulic clam dredges. An owner of
a flounder ITQ would quickly conclude that the future value of his rights to the flounder
fishery do not depend on his actions. So, two courses of action are open to him:
*  He can attempt to bribe (or sue) the owners of clam dredge ITQ's in order to
get them to desist from fishing in areas that are flounder nurseries.
*  If that negotiation is unsuccessful  or is accompanied  by a large number of
similar, cost-ineffective  negotiations associated with each interaction that
involves flounder, he might very well decide the rational way to behave is
the same as  in an open-access  resource.*
The more that is learned about ecological interactions, the more an ITQ system
is likely to give rise to newly understood externalities.  Basically, the problem with an
ITQ from an ecosystem perspective  is that the institution is not likely to be able to
address  the  sources  of sustainability.  As a  consequence,  credibility  and  incentive
alignments are likely to break down, leading to typical open-access behavior.
Other traditional management approaches based on single-species theory appear
equally maladapted to ecosystem management.  Unitary control of  the sort traditionally
exercised by  most national  fisheries  agencies  (although rarely  complete)  is  well-
designed for the purpose of  controlling fishing effort over the entire range of  individual
stocks. But, from an ecosystem perspective, this traditional approach is poorly adapted
to deal with the multiple scales at which ecological  events take place. Not only are
there problems of dealing with large numbers of localized biological events, but also
there are much more numerous and similarly scaled human activities associated with
those events. Thus, one could expect the transactions costs of managing the multiple
scales of an ecosystem to be very high for a unitary management structure.
In  short, the  organization  of our  current  management  institutions  does  not
*  One  might  possibly conceive  of a  system  of species-specific  property  rights  in  which  ecological
externalities  were  resolved  by  an extensive  web  (paralleling  all  relevant  ecological  interactions)
of private  rules  or  contracts.  The  costs  of  negotiating,  monitoring  and  enforcing  such  rules
most probably  would  be  prohibitively  expensive.  In  fact,  if there  were  resource  "rents,"  the
transaction  costs of such  a  system  might  easily  absorb  those payments.
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management. New institutional structures tailored to meet this different view of the
fisheries management problem are required.
In our search for appropriate institutions, we have concluded that decentralized
(layered), democratic  institutions are most likely to produce the result of a sustained
fisheries ecosystem. Our reasons are simply that democratic institutions appear more
likely than any alternative  to meet the five criteria cited above, given an ecosystem
approach to the biology of the fishery. To be more  specific:
1. A decentralized (layered or hierarchical)  democratic arrangement can fully
encompass  the various  temporal  and  spatial scales  at which phenomena
(biological and human) that are relevant to overfishing take place. Careful
partitioning of  authority can lead to coordinated policies at the various scales.
2.  Democratic institutions, especially at the local level, are most likely to generate
credible, enforceable rules because those institutions require consent among
local fishermen. Additionally, in situations of uncertainty where learning is
important, the relative  independence  of local units of governance  can be
expected  to  lead  to  a multiplicity of policies  (or experiments)  that  can
accelerate the overall management learning process.
3. Assurances  that  others  are following  the  rules  are best  developed under
circumstances  in which  a person can verify the behavior of others.  Local
democratic processes create the networks and conditions to generate  such
assurances most easily.
4.  A democracy, like any other management process, inevitably will be forced
to make difficult decisions that trade off current and future welfare. We believe
democratic decisionmaking at the local level will respond to these problems
by attempting  to avoid as much  as possible any allocative decisions  that
involve windfall gains or losses to participants. In order to accomplish this,
a local democracy will tend to stick to rules that are relatively permanent in
nature and are not a function of the current state of the resource.
For example,  a quota decision is very much a function  of the current
state of the resource.  On the other hand, rules about how, when and where
to  fish  are  more  likely  to be  tuned  to.  . .say,  the  annual  occurrence  of
spawning activity, rather than how many fish are spawning.
Relatively permanent rules about how, when and where to fish also have
the  distinct  advantage  of having  no  clear  allocative  outcomes.  The
complexity of the ecosystem is such that each user cannot easily determine
whether a rule might or might not provide a competitive advantage in the
long run;  after all,  the response  of the ecosystem  is as  difficult  to predict
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tends to have the effect of minimizing the  game playing that takes place
during the process  of rule formation.*
In short, if these local democratic institutions use rules about how, when
and where to fish, they can be expected to handle the problem of short- and
long-term tradeoffs  rather  well. Given  that expectation-combined  with
credible  rules  and processes  and  with  assurances  about  fisherman
compliance-the conditions for alignment of individual incentives and the
social objectives  of conservation are likely to be met rather well.
5. In  addition,  transactional  efficiency  is  likely to  be  well-handled  by
decentralized  institutions.  An approach  to  fisheries  management  that
emphasizes rules about how, when and where to fish requires a great deal of
local information as a basis for decisionmaking. Thus, keeping local decisions
as local as possible reduces the kinds of transaction/information  problems
that plague centralized institutions of all kinds.
One of the "bedrock truths" of modem economics concerns the value of
decentralization  in complex  systems.  Corporations,  political units  or any
other kind of complex human organization can be expected to operate more
efficiently  through reduction of transactions  costs.  There is  no reason to
expect  complex  fisheries  management  systems  to  be  immune  from  this
requirement.
It  is possible to elaborate much more on the reasons why we feel democratic
decentralization  will prove to be the  most  workable approach  to  conservation  of
fishery  resources.
Of course, there are circumstances  and fisheries in which conditions seem to
conspire  to  make  the  approach  easily  feasible.  There  are  others  in  which  the
establishment  of appropriate institutions will be more difficult. The Maine strategy
for implementation of  this approach may serve to illustrate these different circumstances.
Implementing a Democratic Approach
The Maine strategy is to "go slow" in order to keep arrangements  as simple as
possible and to build on existing customs as much as possible. Further, we intend to
let the strategy  evolve as part of the process.
*  This is likely to be much more the case at the local level, where spatially related rules cannot be used
easily  to  the  advantage  or disadvantage  of an  individual  or group.  In his  Theory  of Justice, John
Rawls  points  to  similar  salutory  effects  of uncertainty  and, in  fact,  claims  that  the  development
of fair  rules  is dependent  on uncertainty  with regard  to  each  person's  expectations  about the
impact  of the rule  on  his  future  welfare-what  Rawls  calls  a "veil  of ignorance."  The  complexity
of ecosystem  processes  appears  to  assure  this  situation  (Rawls  1971).
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be given. And this outline may change as participants in the process gain experience
and alter the strategy.  After all, our broad thrust is to give increasing responsibility
for fishery rules to the users.
We have begun the process with our lobster fishery. This is a healthy fishery. It
is the principal state fishery, and it has a rule structure consistent with an ecological
approach (how, when and where).  Perhaps most important, the lobster fishery has a
long history of informal,  local self-governance. Even at the state level, rule making
basically has been the result of consensus among the major regions and associations
within the fishery.
This process has  not been without  its  problems.  For years,  fishermen  have
argued for trap limits. But, differences  in the biological and other circumstances of
the fishery have made a uniform limit infeasible-i.e., what is sensible in one region
is nonsensical in another.
The need to tailor trap-limit rules to the different local circumstances within the
fishery was  the proximate initiating  factor for the  current strategy. In the past, the
state might have tried to implement centrally determined rules. This time, however, it
was decided the state would set up the institutions that would allow local fishermen
to determine what was appropriate for their region.
On July 1, 1996, a system of local zones-each with an elected council-came
into law after a long series of hearings and workshops.*  The zones divide the state
into seven areas that differ according to ecological conditions and manner of fishing.
The number of fishermen in each zone varies from about 900 to 1,300.
Zone councils will  have authority over rules that  are purely local  in nature.
Initially, this authority will be limited to number of traps, traps on trawl,** and days
and times fished. But, as experience is gained with the council process, this authority
may be extended to other kinds of (still local) rules. Councils will be able to change
fishing-related  rules only through a referendum process that requires  a two-thirds
approval.  This is a very conservative process, designed to assure strong consensus.
It also is meant to remove any direct power from the council itself and any incentive
for a small group to try to dominate the local council for the group's advantage.
If and when the lobster councils appear to be working, there are two logical next
developments. We fully expect the creation of a new council of councils, designed to
handle problems that extend beyond the local level. Other fisheries-urchins,  scallops,
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*  See  the  pages  following  this paper  for the proposed  zone/council  system  description  used in  the
last round of hearings.
** "Traps  on  trawl" refers  to  a  method of fishing in  which a  number  of traps  are  strung  along  a
line  that  is bouyed  to  the  surface, usually  at  both ends.eels, shrimp-are likely to be brought into the local council system. Exactly how this
will unfold after July  1996 will depend greatly  on what role the councils choose  to
play and what they choose  to initiate.  Still, to a great extent the  state has begun  to
relegate  itself to  the  role  of supporting  and facilitating  these  local  governance
processes. For example,  we also are developing  a system of scientific liaisons, with
state  and university scientists  and  the councils.
Conclusions
Whether this approach to fisheries management succeeds depends principally
upon: (1) fishermen's willingness to accept collective responsibility for conservation
of the resource and (2) the existence of institutions that provide a workable atmosphere
in which collective  decisions can be debated and made.  Good science is important,
but cannot drive the process. What must drive it is the incentives of individuals and
groups.  Provided there  are the institutions to form and articulate  those incentives,
the demand for good science will come forth. If this approach is compared with usual
fisheries management,  its most fundamental distinguishing feature is that it puts the
creation of appropriate individual incentives  first and science  second.
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SUMMARY*
Lobster Zone and Council Proposal
from the Lobster Zones Working Group
Revised in response to public hearings
In June 1995 the legislature passed a law requiring the Commissioner of  Marine Resources
to  establish  lobster  zones  and councils.  She appointed  a  working  group  of industry  and
industry-related professionals  to fill in the rules for the operation of the zones and councils.
These  pages  summarize  the working  group's  efforts.  In  response  to comments  at public
meetings held in January and February  1996, the role of the councils has been significantly
simplified. The  following is  a description of the proposed  council/zone  system, when fully
operational  (i.e., on or before July 1, 1997):
1.  Seven zones, each with an elected council.
2.  Class I, II and III license holders ages 18 years or older will be eligible to vote in the
zone in which they predominantly fish.  Annual elections will occur at the time set by each
council.
3.  The role of the council is to develop proposals for changes in fishing rules that will
be  decided  by referendum  vote by  mail of all  zone  fishermen.  Council members  in  each
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* Public  document  used  to  describe  new zone/council  arrangements  for  Maine  lobster  fishery.zone will be elected  for three-year staggered  terms by district or harbor, in order to achieve
broad  and  equitable representation.  The  election districts  or harbors  in  each  zone  and the
number of council members will be determined  by each zone.  In general,  council  members
should represent  100 or fewer license holders.  A provision for recall will be included  in the
Zone Council operating procedures  developed by the Commissioner.
4.  All changes must be made by referendum  vote. A minimum of 2/3 of those voting
is required for any change in fishing rules. The following rules are subject to zone decisions:
(a) number of traps fished, including time allowed for compliance;  (b)  number of traps on a
trawl; and (c)  time  or days of fishing.
5.  All fishing laws will remain in place until or unless the zones vote to make changes
within their power.
6.  Zone jurisdiction will extend to the Area 3 line (approximately  30 miles offshore).
Beyond  that line, harvesters  must abide by State rules.
7.  Councils  may  apply rules  differently  in  parts of the  zone;  for  example,  rules
concerning traps on a trawl may vary from area to  area.
8.  A license holder may fish in more than one zone (or subzone), but must abide by the
most restrictive of the zone (or subzone) trap limits and times or days of fishing  throughout
all his  fishing  activity. The  more restrictive  limit  does not  apply  to  traps on a  trawl;  rules
regarding  the number of traps on a trawl are considered place-specific.
9.  In order to assure a smooth transition and follow the law, special procedures will be
required during the first year of the zone and council  system.
Transition Procedures:
Appointment of council members in the first year. The law requires the Commissioner
to appoint the initial group of council members. During March and April of this year meetings
will be held in each zone for the purpose of changing nominees.
First official election. The initial council members  will serve no more than one year.
Within that year they must hold an official election under the procedures set up for the council
system.  These initial  appointed councils  will not  be able  to  initiate referendums  regarding
fishing rule changes.
Zone lines. Workable zone lines depend upon knowledge about local fishing practices.
Consequently,  the  working  group  suggests  that  the  lines  established  on July  1, 1996,  be
recognized as temporary until such time as the adjacent councils agree upon a final line.
Setting up council operating  procedures. During the first year the councils must:
(1) establish final zone lines. The initial councils may recommend additional zones;
(2)  establish the rules under which they operate; and
(3) define election districts that provide fair and equitable representation among
fishermen and harbors.
Professional  advice  and resources have  been identified  to  assist the  councils  in the
initial setup work. A prototype of council operating procedures and bylaws will be provided
to the council.
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